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NOTES.
RIGHT OF MAJORITY TO SELL ENTIRE CORPORATE ASSETS
AGAINST DISSENT OF MINORITY-AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER
MODERN STATUTES-Although the language of courts and writers

does not always strictly so limit them, the decisions generally distinguish a transfer of all the assets of a prosperous, going concern, from
that of one in a precarious financial condition. However, equity
grants relief both at common law and under modem statutes where it
feels that the minority is being oppressed or defrauded, irrespective of
the corporation's financial status. Accordingly the following classification suggests itself :
I. AT COMMON LAW

A. ProsperousBusiness Corporations
Courts ' and writers 2 generally express the common law rule to
be that the majority can not sell all the assets of a prosperous business
corporation, against the dissent of a single stockholder. This doctrine
originated in the dictum of Ward v. Society of Attornies' that voluntary actual dissolution of a corporation by the majority was not permissible at common law.4 Starting with this as a premise, the courts
'Kean v. Johnson, 9 N. J.Eq. 4Ol (1853); and Abbott v. American Hard
Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578 (N. Y. 1861) are usually cited as the leading cases.
Other cases are: Myerkoff v. Bankers' Securities, Inc., 147 Atl. IO5 (N. J.
1929), and thereon Note (1929) 14 MINN. L. REV. 58; Tillis v. Brown, 154
Ala. 403, 45 So. 589 (19o8); see Geddes v. Anaconda Mining Co., 254 U. S.
590, 595, 41 Sup. Ct 209, 211 (1921) ; Smith v. Stone, 21 Wyo. 52, 85, 128 Pac.
612, 617 (1912).
For full list of cases see Note (189o) 6 L. R. A. 676, 678,
and Note (1912) 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 396. Likewise the majority cannot lease
the entire property of a prosperous corporation. Small v. Minneapolis ElectroMatrix Co., 45 Minn. 264, 407 N. W. 797 (891).
A fortiori, the majority
cannot ratify a sale or lease made by the directors, against the dissent of the
minority. Russell v. Patterson Co., 232 Pa. 113, 8I At. 136 (1911), and Note
thereon (1912) 36 L. R. A. (N. s.) i99.
"3 CooK, CORPORATIONS (7th ed. 1913) § 670; 6 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS
(3d ed. 1927) § 4499; I CLARK & MARSHALL, PrVATE CORPORATIONS (igoi)
§ 16o (b); 6 FLETcHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (1919) § 4011; NOYES, INTERcoRPORATE RELATIONS (2d ed. 1909) 205; I BEACH, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
(1891) § 357; HARWEY, RIGHTS OF THE MINORITY STOCKHOLDER AND OF THE
RAILWAY SECURITY HODER (i929) 26; BALLANTINE PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
(1927) 209.
3I Coll. 370, 379 (Eng. 1844).
Smith v. Smith, 3 Desaus 557 (1813) is

frequently erroneously cited as authority for the same proposition.
'Barton v. Enterprise Loan, etc., Ass'n, 114 Ind. 226, 16 N. E. 486 (1887);
New Orleans, etc., R. R. v. Harris, 27 Miss. 517 (1854) ; 2 CooK, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 629; 2 SPELLING, PRIVATE CORPORAToNs (1892) § 1012. Contra:
Wilson v. Proprietors of Central Bridge, 9 R. I. 590 (1870).
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reasoned that the sale of all the corporate assets was a dissolution in
practical effect, and therefore refused to allow the majority to accomplish in circuitous fashion what they could not do directly.5 The
doctrine was thus stated in People v. Ballard:'
"A corporation cannot cease to exist of its own will. Its life
continues until either the charter period has expired or the court
has decreed a dissolution. . .
As it cannot take its own life
directly, it cannot do so indirectly, for that would be a fraud upon
the law and against public policy."
In Kean v. Johnson I a more tenable theory was expounded,
namely, that there is an implied contract among the stockholders at the
time of organization that the corporation is to be run for profit, and
shall continue in existence for the specified period, or in absence of
charter limit, as long as the business prove profitable. Therefore the
sale of all the assets would violate the contract and defeat the purpose
of organization, by terminating the corporate existence, and accordingly must be prohibited on the suit of the minority.8 In a few of the
subsequent cases the two theories were linked together.9 But the vast
majority of the later cases have based their decision on the contract
doctrine. 10
The "dissolution" theory has been disputed on the ground that
actual dissolution by the voluntary act of the corporation was not prohibited at common law, and that therefore the courts based their rule
on a false premise.1 The "contract" theory also has been criticised,
See Abbott v. American Hard Rubber Co., supra note i, at 591.

a134 N. Y. 269, 294, 32 N. E. 54, 59 (1892).
7
Supra note i.
'Note (19o6) 2 L. R. A. (N. s.) 493; 6 THompSON, loc. cit. supra note 2.

'In re Importers' & Grocers' Exchange of N. Y., 2 N. Y. Supp. 257 (1888).
"Geddes v. Anaconda Mining Co.; Small v. Minneapolis Electro-Matrix
Co., both supra; note i.
'Mr. Wrarren claims that voluntary dissolution was possible at common
law. Warren, Voluntary Transfers of Corporate Undertakings (1916) 30
HARv. L. Ray. 335, 339. He criticizes the oft cited cases Ward v. Society of
Attornies, as dictum, and Smith v. Smith, as dictum that dissolution is possible
(both supra note 3). He maintains that the cases following this theory blindly
reason from these dicta, as though authorities in support of the proposition. He
then cites three cases in support of his theory that the majority could sell the
assets: Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. R., 30 Pa. 42 (1858); Wilson v. Proprietors of Central Bridge, supra note 4; State v. Chilhowee Woolen Mills Co.,
I15 Tenn. 266, 89 S. W. 741 (9o5).
It is submitted that the first two cases were
of companies financially embarrassed, and in the last cited case the corporation
had not yet started business operations; therefore, it would seem that these
cases are improperly classified with prosperous business corporations. On distinction between prosperous and financially incompetent corporations see Gordan
Paxton, Right of a ProsperousPrivate Corporationto Troapsfer its Entire Property Against the Will of the Minority of the Stockholders (19o2) 8 VA. L.
REG. i.
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because the sale usually occurs only when it is more profitable to
transfer the assets than to continue the corporate existence, and thus
the real purpose of the corporation, i. e., to be run for profit, is fostered. 2 Regardless of the accuracy of the theories upon which based,
the rule was consistently followed by the courts. Substantively, the
rule is open to the more severe criticism that it gives the minority (be
it the holder of a single share) extraordinary power over the other
shareholders. 13 Thus, the minority can force the majority to buy
them out at an exorbitant price, or forfeit the opportunity of a very
advantageous transfer; or can absolutely prevent such transfer by
refusing to sell or consent thereto; or if the rule is carried to its logical conclusion,'" they can force the corporation to continue to operate
in status quo.'5
Although frequently so stated, the above rule is not universally
accepted. A few jurisdictions have held that the majority could properly transfer all the assets of a prosperous trading and manufacturing
For the other side of the picture, i. e., when the minority may petition for dissolution see Grant v. First National Bank of Grand Junction, 48 Cal. 557, 1II
Pac. 556 (igio), and Note thereon (191I) 21 ANN. GAs. 422; Note (1929) 77
. oF PA. L. REv. 671.
The minor premise of this theory is subject to the attack that sale of corporate assets and dissolution are very different. In the first situation the corporation becomes dormant only, and may be liable for taxes, etc.; in dissolution
the corporation actually dies. See Note (1929) 14 MINN. L. REv. 58, 61.
'Note (192o) 7 Va. I. Rev. 640.
'In re Timis, 20o N. Y. 177, 181, 9 N. E. 522, 524 (191o) ; BALLANTINE,
p. cit. supra note 2, at 210.
"See State v. Chilhowee Woolen Mills, supra note ii, at 272, 89 S. W. 741,
742.

Especially is this true since the passing of the Clayton Act, if the purpose
of the sale of assets is the uniting of two corporations, and those corporations
are in competition, for union by purchase of stock or creation of a holding
company is thereby prohibited. Section 7, of the Clayton Act provides: "No
corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation engaged
also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially

lessen competition between [such corporations]." 38 STAT. 731 (1914) ; U. S. C.
Compact Ed., Title 15, § 18 (1928). For compilation of cases thereon see I5
U. S. C. A. § I8 (1927).

However, in a number of cases stock in the buying corporation was the sole
consideration for the minority's interest Knoxville v. Knoxville & Ohio R. R.,
2
Fed. 758 (C. C. E. D. Tenn, 1884); Morris v. Eylton Land Co., 125 Ala.
263, 28 So. 513 (1899) ; Byrne v. Schuyler Electric Mfg. Co., 65 Conn. 336, 31
At. 833 (1895) ; People v. Ballard, supra note 6; Kean v. Johnson, supra note
I; cf. Forrester v. Boston, etc., Mining Co., 21 Mont. 544, 55 Pac. 229 (1898).
This alone seems sufficient ground to restrain the sale, because it may be quite
unfair to the minority for: (I) the stock may not be listed on any exchange,
or for other reasons be unmarketable; (2) the market price may be much lower
than the actual book value; (3) the majority may force down the market
price so as to be able to buy the minority's shares at a much lower figure than
their real value. However, there seems to be no mention of this in the cases.
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concern. 1 These decisions are based on the theory that the contract
of organization gave the majority the power to control the business
policy of the corporation; that an advantageous transfer of all the
assets comes within the scope thereof, and the minority are therefore
precluded from now complaining."
This rule is open to similar criticism, i. e. that it subjects the
minority to the absolute control of the majority, and this may be used
to oust the minority from sharing in a profitable undertaking.
B. Corporationsin PrecariousFinancial Condition
In contrast with the conflict of opinion where the corporation is
prosperous, the courts unanimously lay down the rule, pithily expressed in Price v. Holcomb: Is
"If, however, just cause exists for selling the property, as
when the corporation is insolvent, 19 . . . the sale is necessary
to pay debts, 2
. . . the business is a failure, 21 . . . an
22
unprofitable one, and the best interests of all require it, the
majority have clearly power to order sale .
," 2In supporting this rule, no mention is made of the "dissolution"
theory, but the "contract" theory is rebutted, in that the transfer in
24
this situation is furthering rather than defeating corporate purposes,
" Berdenhoff v. Insurance Co., 16o Iowa 629, 142 N. W. 434 (1913);
Bowditch v. Jackson Co., 76 N. H. 351, 82 Atl. 2104 (1912); Tanner v. Lindell
R. R., ISo Mo. I, 29 S. W. 155 (29o3); Black v. Delaware Co., 22 N. J. Eq.

130 (1871); see Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 7 Gray 393, 404 (Mass.
1856) ; Cohen v. Big Stone Gap Iron Co., III Va. 468, 471, 69 S. E. 359, 36o
(1910) ; 2 WATERMAN, CORPORATIONS (1888)

(2d ed. 1886)

§ 413;

§ 42O; MORANVITZ, PRIVATE COR-

7 VA. L. REV. 640.
Although Black v. Delaware Co., supra, was generally conceded to overrule
Kean v. Johnson, supra note I, Meyerkoff v. Bankers' Securities, Inc., supra
note i, followed the latter without mention of the former.
' 7 Bowditch v. Jackson Co., supra note 16.
PORATIONS

Note (1920)

89 Iowa 123, 135, 56 N. W. 407, 410 (1893).

Not all the cases cited in

notes 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, infra, appear in the quoted opinion.
" Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., supra note 16.
Big Muddy Iron Co. v. Manufacturer's Savings Bank, 97 Mo. 38, iO S. W.
865 (1888);

Sewell v. East Cape May Beach Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 717, 25 AtI.

229 (1892) ; Pitcher v. Lone Pine Surprise Cons. Mining Co., 39 Wash. 6o8,
81 Pac. lo47 (1905).
" Cardiff v. Johnson, 126 Wash. 454, 218 Pac. 269 (923),
12

and Note (1923)

GEo. L. J. 49; Price v. Holcomb, su.pra note I8.
'Hancock v. Holbrook, 9 Fed. 353 (C. C. La. 1881); Hoag v. Edwards,

69 Misc. 237, 128 N. Y. Supp.

2O35

(191o); Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co.,

supra note 16.

1 CLARK & MARSHALL, Op. Cit. supra note 2, at § 16o (a) ; 3 CooK, loc.
cit. supra note 2; 2 FLETCHER, op. cit. s$praW note 2, at § 1207; 6 THoAisoN,

loc. cit. supra note 2.
24 NOYES, op. cit. sfpra note 2, § III.

NOTES

as it "arises ex necessitate . . . [and] is a duty, as well as a right,
25
of the majority ....
Broadly speaking, this rule seems sound, for it often enables the
stockholders to realize something out of the debris of a hopeless enterprise. However, if the majority are thus enabled to take advantage
of the minority, it is open to the objection stated above. In a
number of these cases payment for the assets of the failing corporation was in stock of a buying corporation. To force the minority to
take shares of another concern, even though it is not feasible to continue corporate business on the present plan, seems outside their contract of organization, and may be entirely unfair.26
C. Special Grounds for Equitable Intervention

Regardless of the financial condition of the corporation, if the
transfer of corporate property by the majority entails fraud or oppression on the minority, courts uniformly state that relief will be granted
the latter.2' This is founded on the theory that the majority are
quasi-trustees, and as expressed in Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric
Co.: 2 9

"Such a majority .

.

.

owe to the minority the duty to

exercise good faith, care, and diligence to make the property in
their charge produce the largest possible amount, to protect the
interests of

.

.

.

the minority

.

.

.

and to secure and

I Smith v. Stone, supra note i, at 85, 128 Pac. 612, at 617.
-' See note 15, supra for reasons why this may be unfair. Cases permitting
payment in stock are: Sawyer v. Dubuque Printing Co., 77 Iowa 242, 42, N. W.
300 (1889); cf. Tanner, v. Lindell R. R., supra note 16; Lauman v. Lebanon
Valley R. R, supra note ii. Likewise, in several of the cases where the
majority were allowed to sell the assets of a prosperowu company, stock was
forced on the minority. Bowditch v. Jackson Co., supra note 16; cf. State v.
Chilhowee Woolen Mills, supra note ii.
- Sellers v. Phcenix Iron Co., 13 Fed. 2o (1881) ; Kidd v. New Hampshire
Traction Co., 72 N. H. 273 (19o3); Cantwell v. Columbia Lead Co., igg Mo.
I, 97 S. W. 167 (igo6); 8 FLETCHER, op. cit. supr, note 2, § 5458. Likewise
in the case of actual dissolution the minority are protected from fraud.
Wheeler v. Abilene Nat. Bank Co., 159 Fed. 391 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o8) ; People
v. Hektograph Co., io Abb. N. C. 358 (N. Y. 1882); Bailey's Appeal, 96 Pa.
:2.3 0iS8o).

The following are the ulterior motives which impell the majority to sell

all the assets or attempt dissolution, "(a) unauthorized consolidation with
another corporation; (b) reorganization in order through a new corporation to
enter upon undertakings dtra vires of the existing corporation; (c) reorganization for the purpose of eliminating contentious or uncongenial stockholders;

(d) sale to the majority stockholders or corporation controlled by them for

purpose of defrauding the minority of their interest; (e) extinguishment of
contracts beneficial to the corporation but burdensome to the majority stockholders." William H. Fain, Lintitafms of the Statutory Power of Majority
Stockholders to Dissolve a Corporaton. (192) 25 HARv. L. RFv. 677, 68o.

144 Fed. 765, 77, (C. C. A. 8th, i9o6). See also Windmuller v. Standard

Distilling & Distribution Co., 114 Fed. 491, 494 (C. C. N. J. 19o2).
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deliver to them their just proportion of the income and proceeds.
of the property."
Accordingly, the courts grant relief to the minority, where the
29
obvious purpose of the sale is to squeeze them out of the corporation,
or to enable the majority to enter a profitable venture from which the
minority are excluded;30 where the sale is to the majority, 1 or to a
corporation in which they have large interest, 32 if it appears that the
minority are in any way unfairly treated; where the consideration for
the sale is grossly inadequate, " or so small as to amount to a gift. 4
However, mere inadequacy of consideration where the transaction is
apparently bona fide will not entitle the minority to relief.3 5 Likewise

the advantage secured by the majority may be so intangible that equity
will refuse to act, on the ground that it is not the court's duty to step
in and manage the business. 3
Furthermore, as mentioned supra,
equity will not relieve the minority solely because they are forced to
take stock in the buying company.
'DeNeufville v. New York Cent., etc., R. R., 81 Fed. io (C. C. A. 2d,
1897); Woodruff v. Howes, 88 Cal. 184, 26 Pac. iii (i89i); Cantwell v.
Columbia Lead Co., supra note 27.
Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 27 Fed. 625 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1886);
Noyas, op. cit. sanpra note 2, § 114. The majority are not permitted to take the
goodwill of the corporation with them into the new concern without accounting

to the minority.

Nave-McCord Mercantile Co. v. Ranney, 29 F. (2d) 383
1928), commented on (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 8o7;
Contra: Watkins v. National Bank of Lawrence, 51 Kans. 254, 32 Pac. 914

(C. C. C. A. 8th,

(1893); Green v. Bennett, 11o S. W. io8 (Tex. 19o8).

, Chicago Hansom Cab Co. v. Yerkes, 141 Ill. 320, 3o N. E. 667 (1892);

Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., smipra note 3o. The courts will scrutinize
mord closely where sale is to the majority. Mumford v. Ecuador Development
Co., iii Fed. 639 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. igoi); NoyEs, loc. cit. supra note 30.
It has been held that any sale to the majority is voidable. Reilley v. Oglebay,
25 W. Va. 36 (1884). Likewise, it has been held that the minority have the
right to demand a public sale rather than a private one. Mason v. Pewabic
Mining Co., 133 U. S. 5o, 1o Sup. Ct. 224 (1889). And even if at a fair price
one of the majority buy it,
if another prospective purchaser offer more, the sale
will be set aside. Wheeler v. Abilene Nat. Bank Co., supra note 27. On the
general topic of the right of the majority to purchase corporate property see
note (19o9) 14 ANN. CAs. 920; Note (19o8) 16 L. R. A. (N. s.) 892.
'Hinds v. Fiskbill & M. Equitable Gas Co., 96 App. Div. 14, 88 N. Y.
Supp. 954 (1904); 3 CooK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2122. So also where the
majority lease. Meeker v. Winthrop Iron Co., 17 Fed. 48 (C. C. W. D. Mich.
1883); Barr v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R., 96 N. Y. 444 (1884).
' Woodruff v. Howes, supra note 29; see Wall v. Anaconda Copper Mining
Co., 216 Fed. 242, 246 (D. C. Mont 1914).
Ashton v. Dashaway Ass'n, 7 L. R. A. 8og (Cal. 1889). Likewise the
corporate name cannot be given away. Armington v. Palmer, 21 R. I. iog, 42
At. 308 (1898), and cases in arguments of counsel, reported in 43 L. R. A.
95 (1899).
S Peabody v. Westerly Waterworks, 37 Atl. 807 (R. I. 1897). See also
Mountain States Packing Co. v. Curtis, 281 Pac. 737 (Colo. 1929).
Windmuller v. Standard Distilling & Distribution Co., supra note 28.

NOTES

If the majority are to be considered as quasi-trustees, as the
courts suggest, the minority's interests would be more properly protected if the court would require an accounting of the corporation, and
thereon appraise the value of their stock and give them the right to
exchange it for cash. 7
II. UNDER MODERN STATUTES

Statutes in every state now provide methods whereby a corporation can voluntarily go into actual dissolution. 38 Apparently with a
view toward eliminating the control that a small minority could exercise over the other stockholders of a prosperous concern, the legislatures of a number of states have passed statutes which provide for
voluntary actual dissolution on vote of a bare majority,3 9 or of a
specified percentage of the shareholders. 40 Where the specified majority comply with such statutes, there is no question about their right to
wind up the corporation, even though it is done with a view to reorganization, 41 unless such fraud or oppression
on the minority is
42
present as to justify equitable intervention.
However, these statutes, ipso facto, do not settle the problem of
the sale of all the corporate assets. But the law has changed in many
states which have statutes providing for actual dissolution by a specified majority. 43 The courts have reasoned that the stockholders knew
"This was specified to be the common law practice in Maxler v. Freeport

Bank, 275 Pa. 510, n19 Ati. 592 (923). Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123
N. Y. 91 (189o), laid down the proposition that equity should inquire "what is
a fair price?"
'Warren,

op. cit. supra1 note II, at 347-348.

List of such statutes, ibid.

MAss. GEN. LAws (1921) c. 155, § 50; N. Y. CoNs. LAws ANN. (Supp.
1929) c. 24, § ioi; Acr OF APRIL 9, I856, P. L. 293, PA. STAT. (West, i92o)
§ 2591.
" CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PRoC. (Deering, 1923) § 1228 (two-thirds) ; CONN.
GEN. STAT. (1918) c. 188, § 3446 (three-fourths) ; DEL. REV. CODE (1915) c. 65,
§ 39 (two-thirds); ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1925) c. 32, § 73 (two-thirds);
N. J. COmP. STAT. (igio) CORP., § 31 (two-thirds); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
(1925) § 1387 (four-fifths).
'

' 1Riker v. United Drug Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 319 (1911); Watkins v. National
Bank of Lawrence, supra note 30.
'White v. Kincaid, 145 N. C. 415, 63 S. E. lO9 (19o8); Note (1Io) 23

L. R.

A. (N. s.) 1117; 2 CLARK & MARSHALL, oP. cit. suprs note 2, at 855.
Metcalf v. American School Furniture Co., iz2 Fed. n15 (C. C. W. D.
N. Y. 1903); Mitchell v. Des Moines & F. D. R. R., 27o Fed. 465 (C. C. A.
2d, 192o); Trisconi v. Winship, 43 La. Ann. 45, 9 So. 29 (189I); Lang v.
Reservation Mining & Smelting Co., 48 Wash. 167, 93 Pac. 208 (I98) ; Noms,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 209. Contra: In re Paine, II6 N. W. O36 (Mich.
1918), and criticism thereof, Note (1918) 2 MINN L. REv. 526; Theis v. Spokane Gaslight Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 Pac. ioo4 (1904); Myerkoff v. Bankers'
Security, Inc., supra note I; cf. Dew v. Northern R. R., 67 N. H. I, 36 AUt.
5IO (1886). A fortiori, an insolvent corporation will be allowed to sell its
assets under such statutes. Lane & Co. v. Maple Cotton Mills, 226 Fed. 692
(C. C. A. 4 th, 1915) ; Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 147 At. 257 (Del. 1929),
and recent case comment thereon (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 423.
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of these provisions at the time of incorporation, and such necessarily
were part of said contract. Therefore, no hardship ensues if practical
dissolution results from a sale of all the corporate assets.
This construction of the statutes has relieved the majority from
the restraint of the dissenting minority, but in so doing it has merely
reversed the situation, now subjecting the latter to the unhampered
dictates of the majority. It is true that equity continues to relieve
against the actions of a merciless, self-aggrandizing majority, whether
they have acted at common law or under apparent statutory protection. 44 Thus sale of all the corporate assets was enjoined: where the
majority were purchasers, and the good will was not computed; 45
where the consideration was thirty year bonds of the buying company;" where it was grossly inadequate.4 T But often the minority are forced to take stock in the selling corporation, which is
not readily marketable or desirable.4 8 Likewise the sale will not be
set aside for mere inadequacy of consideration. 49 Thus the minority
are forced into a position equally as unforunate as that of the majority
who were blocked in their endeavor to take advantage of a profitable
sale.
A number of states seem to have found the correct solution to
the problem. Statutes have been passed providing for the sale of all
the corporate assets on vote of a specified majority.50 Provision is
further made for petition to the court by the minority, whereupon an
accounting of the assets will be made, and an impartial appraisal of
the value of the minority's stock. 51 They then will be entitled to cash
for such stock.
However, it has been held that the common law rule that the vote of the
majority is sufficient to sell the assets of a business in bad financial condition
has not beern changed by these statutes, Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders (1927) 27 CoL L. REV. 547, 555.
"Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N. Y. 185, 123 N. E. 148
(1gig); Bias v. Atkinson, 64 W. Va. 486, 63 S. E. 395 (igog); Koehler v.
St. Mary's Brewing Co., 228 Pa. 649, 77 Atl. ioi6 (igio). Contra: Slattery
v. Greater New Orleans Realty, etc., Co., 128 La. 871, 55 So. 558 (91).
' Nave-McCord Mercantile Co. v. Ranney, supra note 30.
"6 Koehler v. St Mary's Brewing Co., supra note 44.
'Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. ii, 120
Ati. 486 (1923), and comment thereon (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 436.
"Metcalf v. American School Furniture Co., supra note 42; cf. Fraer v.
Lucas Prospecting Co., 124 Iowa lO7, 99 N. W. 290 (19o4). Contra: Forrester
v. Boston, etc., Mining Co., supra note 15; NoyEs, loc. cit. supra note 42. The
mere promise of the buying corporation to pay is subject to being set aside by
minority. Koehler v. St Mary's Brewing Co., szupra note 44.
Smith v. Stone, spra note i; Koehler v. Brewing Co., snpra note 44.
MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 156 §42 (two-thirds); N. Y. CONS. L.Aws
(Cahill, 1923) c. 6o, § 20 (two-thirds); MONT. REv. CODES (19o7) p. 1324,
§ 44og (two-thirds); OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 8712 (three-fourths).
' MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921)
c. 156 § 46; MONT. REv. CODES (1907) p. 1327,
§§4411, 4412; N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 6o, §21. OHIO GEN. CODE
(Page, 1926) § 8713; AcT OF MAY 3, I909, P. L. 408, § 5, PA. STAT. (West,
1920) § 5752.

NOTES

Decisions under such statutes seem as equitable as is possible in
view of the conflicting interests involved.52 On the one hand, the
majority can offer the minority the alternatives of joining them in the
sale and new enterprise, or accepting cash for their shares along with
the discontinuance of the corporation; on the other hand, the minority
are assured a proper evaluation of their interests.13 The majority
cannot be obstructed in an enterprise that appears profitable, and the
minority cannot be catapulted into a concern in which they have no
faith. True, the present concern may be quite profitable, and the
minority wish to continue its existence in status quo, but it seems that
it is proper that the wishes of the majority should govern. Especially
is this true in the modern corporation, where many of the shareholders
are mere investors who have no real knowledge or interest in the management of the corporation, their chief objective being to obtain the
greatest return on their investment. They could not intelligently
determine the value of such sale, and therefore should not be permitted to block it, as against the directors and majority stockholders.
M.E.L.

ADMISSIBILITY

OF

LEGAL

COUNTERCLAIMS

IN

EQUITABLE

ACTIONs-In the middle of the last century there began a movement
in the field of American legal procedure which has greatly influenced
the historical practice in settling controversies at trial. That was the
code movement which received its first legislative sanction by the
adoption in New York of the Code of 1848.1 One of the great contributions of the Codes to American civil practice was the counterclaim, which did not exist at common law, but first appeared in the
amendments of 1852 to the original New York Code.2 This new provision was broader than equitable set-off, and in effect included a
combination of statutory set-off and recoupment. 3 While recoupment
was limited to actions of contract, and the defendant had no right of
Wall v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., .ruprz note 33; In re Timmis,
supraZ note 13. After the majority vote to sell, the minority can stand thereon
and demand an appraisal, and purchase of its stock. In re Drosnes, 187 App.
Div. 425, i75 N. Y. Supp. 628 (igg), approved (I92o) 2o CoL. L. REv. 344.
On the other hand, once the minority has elected an appraisal it is estopped
to ask that the sale be enjoined for fraud. Wall v. Anaconda Copper Mining
Co., supra note 33.
' For methods of appraisal, fixing proper value of stock, and variations in
the statutes thereon, see Weiner, toc cit. supr note 42.
Y. Laws 1848, c. 379, P. 379.
' Act of April z6, 1852, N. Y. Laws 1852, c. 392, p. 654.
For the historical development of set-off, recoupment, and counterclaim, see
Loyd, The Development of Set-off (1I16) 64 U. OF PA. L. REv. 541; Clark &
Surbeck, The Pleading of Counterclaims (i928) 37 YALE L. J. 3o0.
IN.
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affirmative judgment, and set-off was limited to claims for liquidated
damages arising from contract, the counterclaim was subject to none

of these restrictions.4 As defined by the codes, a counterclaim is a
distinct cause of action arising in favor of the defendant who pleads
it and against the plaintiff in the suit, so that a judgment can be rendered against him.5 The purpose behind such provisions is in accordance with the code theory in general of preventing circuity and multiplicity of actions and to enable the parties to settle their
controversy in
6
one proceeding without unnecessary expense or delay.
The modern tendency to unite legal and equitable pleading
prompts an investigation of the problem of whether the statutes permit
a legal counterclaim to be introduced in proceedings for equitable
relief. This topic will be considered from two angles: (i) Legal
counterclaims in equity under Federal Equity Rule 30; (2) Legal
counterclaims in equity under the state codes.
Legal Counterclaimsin Equity Under Federal Equity Rule 30
Counterclaims in the federal courts are provided for in Equity
Rule 30, the terms of which provide that:
"The answer must state in short and simple form any counterclaim arising out of the transaction which is the subject matter
of the suit, and may, without cross-bill, set up any set-off or
counterclaim against the plaintiff which might be the subject of
an independent suit in equity against him, and such set-off or
counterclaim, so set up, shall have the same effect as a cross-suit,
so as to enable the court to pronounce a final decree
in the same
7
suit on both the original and the cross-claims."

In the recent federal decision of Owl Creek Coal Co. v.Big Horn
Collieries Co.,8 plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from mining its
' POmEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) §§ 607, 613; Loyd, op. cit. spro
note 3, at 565; Clark & Surbeck, op. cit. supra'note 3, at 302.
'Fulton Gas & Electric Co. v. Hudson River Telephone Co., 200 N. Y.
287, 93 N. E. lO52 (1911); Newton v. Otselic Valley Nat. Bank, 224 App.
Div. 527, 231 N. Y. Supp. 526 (1928); Forth Worth Lead & Zinc Co. v. Robinson,
89 Okla. 221, 215 Pac. 205 (1923);

BAYLIES, CODE PLEADING AND PRACTICE

(2d ed. 1904) 418; PomERoY, op. cit. supra note 4, § 614 et seq.; I SUTHERLAND,
CODE PLEADING AND PRACTICE (1910) § 628.
'North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. St. Louis Steel Co., 152 U. S. 596,
615, 14 Sup. Ct. 710, 715 (894);
Parker v. Reid, 127 Ore. 578, 273 Pac.
334 (1928); Advance Thresher Co. v. Klein, 28 S. D. 177, 133 N. W. 5,
(1911) ; Blume, A Rational Theory for Joinder of Causes of Action (1927) 26
MIcH. L. REv. I.
5
28 U. S. C. A. (1928) §723.
836 F. (2d) 485 (D. C. Wyo. 1929). The court applied the principles
adopted by them in the earlier case of Fleming Bros. Lumber Co. v. McDonald
Amusement Co., 36 F. (2d) 483 (D. C. Wyo. 1928) (legal counterclaim in
equity suit to foreclose mechanics' lien).

NOTES

coal in territory adjacent to that of plaintiff, upon the ground that such
acts would cause plaintiff's property to cave in, and loss result from
the flooding of its mine. Defendant interposed a counterclaim for
damages based upon the alleged fault of the plaintiff company in
pumping water from its mine, thereby augmenting the flow of a stream
running across defendant's property and causing surplus water to
drain into defendant's mine, the removal of the water entailing a
severe loss. The Wyoming District Court in refusing to permit the
defendant to sue on the counterclaim, although growing out of the
same transaction as the equity suit, held American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co." to govern. In the interpretation of Equity Rule 30
there has been a wide divergence of opinion, some of which has been
brought out by the latter decision, which curiously enough has been
cited by judges upholding conflicting theories.
The American Mills case was an action to cancel a written guaranty on the ground of fraud, to which defendant set up a counterclaim
for the amount of the guaranty. The Supreme Court in an opinion
by the late Chief Justice Taft held that under Equity Rule 30 a defendant could not be compelled to introduce a legal counterclaim, since
to compel him to do so would deprive him of his right of trial by
jury;' 0 therefore, the counterclaim not being a legal requirement, the
defendant by introducing it waived his defense of adequacy of remedy

at law.
One group of federal courts have decided on the basis of this
decision that a legal counterclaim is not authorized by Equity Rule
30.11 Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion in permitting
legal counterclaims to be introduced in equity suits where they arose
from the same transaction.'12 The latter decisions have been approved
'260 U. S. 36o, 43 Sup. Ct. 149 (1922).
" U. S. CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT VII: "In suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury

shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined
in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law." The decisions under this amendment are annotated in U. S. C. A. CoNsT.
Part 2, p. 581.

'Flagler v. Spellman, 15 F. (2d) 292 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926); Summit
Coal Co. v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 24 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928) ; Elliott
v. Nowata Oil & Refining Co., 37 F. (2d) 76 (C. C. A. xoth, 1929); Fleming
Bros. Lumber Co. v. McDonald Amusement Co., supra note 8.
'Knupp v. Bell, 243 Fed. 157 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1917); Calfilsch v. Humble,
251 Fed. I (C. C. A. 6th, xgi8); Howard v. Leete, 257 Fed. 918 (C. C. A. 6th,
I919); Clifton v. Tomb, 21 F. (2d) 893 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927). In Howard v.
Leete, the court said, at page 924: "As used in the first clause, such 'counterclaim' is not required to be capable of being 'the subject of an independent
suit in equity,' but only that it be one 'arising out of the transaction which is
the subject-matter of the suit.' . . . A construction of the first clause as
relating only to demands 'which might be the subject of an independent suit in
equity' cannot be accepted. To do so would not only require the interpolation
of a clause in terms made applicable only to the second branch of the rule, but
would ignore the existing equity practice."
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by authorities on federal practice as correctly interpreting the
rule.13
The real reason for the controversy on the point can be traced
to a mistaken interpretation of the language in the American Mills
case:
"The petitioner argues that must and may are here set over
against one another for the purpose of enforcing the intention
and effect of the rule to require the defendant in an action in
equity to set out any counterclaim arising out of the subjectmatter of the bill, but to leave it to the option of the defendant
whether a counterclaim or set-off not arising out of the same
transaction shall be interposed or shall be prosecuted by independent bill. The respondent contends that while this may be correct,
the counterclaim growing out of the same transaction must be an
equitable claim, and not a legal one as here. We concur in this
view."

14

This language does not mean that counterclaims to be permitted
in equity suits must be equitable, but that counterclaims which the
defendant can be compelled to introduce must be equitable. The decision goes no further than to hold that "defendant was not obliged to
set up and prove its action under rule 3o, and when it did so, by its
affirmative action, it waived its previous objection to the equitable
jurisdiction and also its right of trial by jury".5
Since Equity Rule 30 has been construed by the Supreme Court
in regard to legal counterclaims as not operating to deprive a defendant of his right of trial by jury, once the defendant chooses to waive
that right 16 and settle his counterclaim in the equity suit, it would
appear that such legal counterclaim may properly be set up in an
equitable action. Furthermore, this view is adopted because of the
expressed policy of the federal courts to adjust demands by counterclaim or set-off rather than by independent suit, in order to avoid
'MONTGOMERY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 1927) § 814;
ROSE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1926) § 550; SImKINs,
FEDERAL PRACTICE (1923)
719. The opposite result is favored by Payne,

Counterclaims under New Federal Equity Rude 30 (1924) IO VA. L. Rav. 598.
"4 American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., supra note 9, at 36 4, 43 Sup.
Ct. at 151.
'Ibid. 366, 43 Sup. Ct at 151. Clifton v. Tomb, supra note 12, at 898;
"American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co. ..
does not hold that a party
may not set up a legal counterclaim growing out of the transaction set forth
in the bill, but simply holds that he is not required by rule 30 to do so .
but that, when he did file it, he waived his objection that the bill should have
been dismissed on the ground that there was an adequate remedy at law." In
McCabe v. Quigan, 36 F. (2d) IOOO (E. D. N. Y. 1929) the court said that
"American Mills v. American Surety Co..
. merely holds that Equity Rule
30, in providing that the answer must state any counterclaim arising out of the
transaction which is the subject-matter of the suit, applies not to legal but to
equitable claims."
'American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., loc. cit. supra note 15.

NOTES
multiplicity of actions.'
The decision in Owl Creek Coal Co. v.Big
Horn Collieries Co. in rejecting the counterclaim adhered too strictly
to the distinction between equity and law in spite of the policy and
legal theory that would suggest the opposite result.
Legal Counterclaimsin Equity Under the State Codes
Most of the states that have adopted code pleading have provisions in their codes to the effect that:
"A defendant may set forth in his answer as many defenses
or counter-claims, or both, as he has, whether they are such as
were formerly denominated legal or equitable." 18
Under this and similar provisions it is a well settled rule that
equitable counterclaims are admissible in actions at law. 9 An analogous result is reached in the reverse situation, and the courts have
to introduce a legal counwithout hesitation permitted the defendant
20
terclaim in an action for equitable relief.
However, the right to interpose a counterclaim is limited by the
codes to certain causes of action:
"i.A cause- of action arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connected with the subject of the action;
"2. In an action arising on contract, any other cause of
action on contract existing at the commencement of the action." 21
Since the second clause applies only to actions founded on contract, it has no application to actions in which equitable relief is sought.
Under the first clause, the defendant's legal counterclaim in an equitable action must arise out of the contract or transaction which is the
' North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. St. Louis Steel Co., supra note 6;
Howard v. Leete, su~pra note 12.
N. Y. Civ., PRAc. AcT § 262 (Clevenger, 1928). The code provisions of

the various states are set forth in PomEaoy, op. cit. suPra note 4, at 804, foot-

note

2.
" POMEROY, op. cit. mpra note
Realty Co., 215 App. Div. 416, 213
25 Utah 65, 69 Pac. 468 (i902).

4, § 640; New York Trust Co. v. American

N. Y. Supp. 569 (1926); Dunham v. Travis,

Hitchcolk v. Mortgage Securities Corp., 95 Fla. 147, 116 So. 244 (1928);
Johnson Service Co. v. Kruse, 121 Minn. 28, 14o N. NV. ii8 (1913); Herb
v. Metropolitan Hospital, 8o App. Div. 145, 8o N. Y. Supp. 552 (19o3) ; Manhattan Life Insurance Co. v. Hammerstein Opera Co., 184 App. Div. 440, 171
N. Y. Supp. 678 (1918); Maher & Co. v. Farnandis, 70 Wash. 250, 126 Pac.
542 (1912). But see Hanna v. Hope, 86 Ore. 303, 310, 168 Pac. 618, 62o
(1917).

21

N. Y. Civ. PRac. Acr. § 266 (Clevenger, 1928). For the provisions of
the various codes, see POmEROy, op. cit. supra note 4, at 8o6, footnote 3.
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basis of the claim, 22 or be connected with the subject of the action.23
These terms have not been defined in the codes and as a result they
tend to overlap in many cases,2 4 but in general it may be said that a
proper counterclaim includes any cause of action, whatever its nature,
arising out of that cause of action alleged in the petition or connected
25
therewith, in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.
The codes permit but do not compel the interposition of a legal
counterclaim; consequently, when an equitable action is brought
against the defendant, he may either set up the legal cause of action
connected with the suit as a counterclaim, or bring a separate legal
action thereon. 20 However, if he selects the first alternative, he is
deemed to have waived his right of trial by jury and cannot demand a
cannot alter
jury trial as a matter of right, since the counterclaim
2 8
the nature of the procedure in the original action.
In Pennsylvania, until 1929, the only provision for counterclaim
in the statutes was in actions of assumpsit by the Practice Act of
1915.29 The courts in interpreting this act have rejected counterclaims
2 0
and have
in trespass although arising out of the same transaction
'Hitchcolk v. Mortgage Securities Corp., supra note 2o; Spiro Mfg. Co.
v. 'Burns Mfg. Co., 2O App. Div. 312, 194 N. Y. Supp. 21o (1922). See
Anderson v. Graber, ig Ohio App. 324, 326 (1924) ; Clark & Surbeck, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 312.
'East Lake Lumber Co. v. Van Gorder, 169 N. Y. Supp. 266 (igi8);
Maher & Co. v. Farnandis, supra note 20.
' L. R. A. 1916 C, 445 contains an exhaustive annotation as to when a
claim upon which a counterclaim is based may be deemed to have arisen out
of the contract or transaction upon which plaintiff's claim is founded, or to be
connected with the subject of plaintiff's action.
'Fort Worth Lead & Zinc Co.v. Robinson, supra note 5, at 224, 215 Pac.
at 207. Note (1924) 33 YAIx L. J.862, 865 defines transactions as "any act
or connected series of acts, affecting the legal relations of two or more persons."
' Johnson Service Co. v. Kruse, supra note 2o; Manhattan Life Insurance
Co. v. Hammerstein Opera Co., supra note 20.
'Dover Lumber Co. v. Case, 31 Idaho 276, 170 Pac. io8 (1918) ; Young v.
Vail, 29 N. M. 324, 222 Pac. 912 (924); Burns v. Corn Exchange National
Bank, 33 Wyo. 474, 24o Pac. 683 (1925). But see Maag v. Maag Gear Co., 193
App. Div. 759, 184 N. Y. Supp. 63o (i2o), in connection with which see (i92i)
30 YALE L. J. 634.

'Larkin

v. Wilson, 28 Kan. 513 (1882); Johnson v. Peterson, go Minn.

503, 97 N. W. 384 (19o3).

'Act of May 14, 1925, P. L. 483, § 14, PA. STAT. (West, I92O) § 17194:
"In actions of assumpsit a defendant may set off, or set up by way of counterclaim against the claim of the plaintiff, any right or claim for which an action
of assumpsit would lie, and a verdict may be rendered in his favor for the
amount found to be due, and judgment entered thereon. If, in, any case in
which the defendant sets up a counter-claim, the action of the plaintiff is
discontinued, dismissed, or a voluntary non-suit suffered, the counter-claim
nevertheless may be proceeded with.'"
'Jarecki v. Montgomery, 69 Pitts. IO9 (292); Rarck v New Hclland
Borough, 5 D. & C. 4 (1923).

NOTES
held it to restrict counterclaims to actions of assumpsit.31 By statute
in 1929 the right to set up counterclaims was extended to trespass
actions,3 2 but no provision has yet been made for counterclaims in
other forms of actions, such as might arise from transactions set forth
as the basis for equitable relief.
The modem tendency to facilitate the speedy settlement of suits
and to settle issues in one proceeding marks a step forward from the
early common law pleading which was highly technical and which
compelled the defendant to pay out money in one action and turn
around and start another suit although the defendant's claim arose
from the same cause of action as the plaintiff's claim. In keeping
with the policy of the codes, it is highly desirable that the practice of
setting up legal counterclaims in equitable actions be extended to those
jurisdictions that have not made provision for it. Such result would
make pleading a means to the end of justice rather than an end in
itself.

S. H.

OWNERSHIP OF INSURANCE PROCEEDS RECOVERED BY ONE WITH
A LIMITED INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY INSURED-The variance of

the attitude of courts toward the disposition of funds paid by the
insurer to one who, with but a limited interest, has insured and recovered for the full value of the property is illustrated in the recent cases
of Miller v. Gold Beach Packing Co.,1- in which a lessee had insured
for 2the value of the fee, and Edwards v. Cleveland Mill and Power
Co. wherein a bailee had similarly insured and recovered from the
insurance company. In the former case the court refused to interfere; in the latter, a trust for the benefit of the bailor was impressed
upon the funds. It is the intent of this note to survey the basis upon
aBacker v. Remov, 69 Pa. Super. 138 (1918); Brown v. Syostek, 2 D.
& C. 431 (1922).
'Act of April 4, 1929, P. L. 14o; amending Section 13 of the 1915 Prac-

tice Act to read: "The defendant in such actions [trespass] may, by affidavit
of defense, in addition to denying negligence on his own part, allege negligence
on the part of the plaintiff, and set up against the plaintiff, in the manner by
this act prescribed, a claim for damages arising out of the same general circumstances upon which the plaintiff's claim is based, and both claims shall in the
said cause be tried in one action."

'282 Pac. 764 (Ore. 1929). Here a tenant for years, who had insured both
his interest and that of his landlord, upon the destruction of the property by

fire, recovered the full amount from the insurance company. The landlord
was held entitled to no proportion of these proceeds.
2 193 N. C. 780, 138 S. E. 131 (197).
In this case a bailee insured the
chattels with his own funds. It was held that the insurance proceeds were held

for the benefit of the owner subject to legitimate charges.
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which recovery has been granted or refused in each of the situations
illustrated by these cases.3
To circumvent the fundamental objection to permitting a third
party to recover the proceeds of a contract to which he is not a party, a
named beneficiary, nor one intended in fact to be benefited, the courts
have utilized various agencies. Before examining the usual holding
of the courts in these categories, namely, bailor-bailee, lessor-lessee
and remainderman-life tenant 4 a survey of the theories upon which
relief has been granted is necessary.
The most usual enunciation is that there is a fiduciary relationship
existing between the owner and the holder of the limited interest, of
sufficient strength to impress a trust upon the insurance money. 5 The
recipient of the funds is termed a "quasi trustee" with the real owner
as cestui que trust. To this theory there is the auxiliary doctrine that
the funds take the place of the property destroyed, the rights of the
parties in respect to the fund being analogous to the specific duties and
privileges in respect to the prior property.6 Other courts have sustained recovery on the theory that the insurance contract is essentially
an obligation of the insurer running not directly to the parties as individuals, but rather with the land or chattel.7 Finally, there is the
The extent of these comments is restricted to situations where the insurance funds have already been secured from the insurer. Upon the subject of the
breadth of the insurable interest as between the insurer and the party insuring,
see Phoix Ins. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., 117 U. S. 312, 6 Sup. Ct. 750
(1886) (bailee); Fowle v. Springfield Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 122 Mass.
191 (1875) (lessee) (recovery against the insurance company) ; Crowley v.
Cohen, 3 Barn. & Adol. 478 (Eng. 1832) (insurance effected by bailee, carrier) ;
CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1928) §§ 292, 293; 4 WAIT, AcTIoNs
AND Dzm Ess (1878) 22 et seq.
'The lessor-lessee situation and that of the remainderman-life tenant have
been similarly and interchangeably treated by the courts, Griffin v. Pfeffer Lumber Co., 211 I1I. App. 71 (918) (lessee for years who recovered more than
the value of his interest); Miller v. Gold Beach Packing Co., supra note I
(lessee for years), and will be so treated in this note.
The analogous cases under the mortgagor-mortgagee, and vendor-vendee
are considered in note 31 infra.
'H-ardy v. Mayhew, 158 Cal. 95, io Pac. 713 (1910) (quasi trustee);
Smith v. Daniel, 2 McCord Chan. 143 (S. C. 1827) (nature of a trust) ; Green
v. Green, 5o S. C. 514, 27 S. E. 952 (1897) (leading case). In the last case,
it is suggested that this concept was fostered by the similar, widely held view
in bailments. If this be sound, it produces one explanation for the minority
holding under the lessor-lessee situation. See infra notes 6, 7.
'Re Cameron, 158 Mich. 174, I22 N. W. 564 (igog) questioned in Blanchard
v. Kingston, 222 Mich. 631, 193 N. W. 241 (1923) (life tenant); see Sampson
v. Grogan, 21 R. I. 174, 42 At. 712 (1899).
Graham v. Roberts, 8 Ired. Eq. 99 (N. C. 1851) ; Clyburn v. Reynolds, 31
S. C. 91, 9 S. E. 973 (1888), follow the concept of those wherein it is held that
proceeds from the insured property which has been devised to a life tenant and
remainderman must be divided.
"Clark v. Leverett, 159 Ga. 487, 126 S. E. 258 (1925) ; Brough v. Higgins,
2 Gratt. 408 (Va. 1846) ; see Welsh v. London Assur. Co., 151 Pa. 6o7, 25 AtI.
142 (1892) (intent found, as fact, to insure for the benefit of both) ; Grant v.
Buchanan, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 334, 81 S. W. 82o (1go4).

NOTES

deeply felt and candidly expressed sentiment that it is "inequitable"
and opposed to public policy to permit one having a mere limited interest to retain the fruits of the insurance while the real owner may
remain with little or no indemnity.'
Lessor-Lessee and Remainderinan-Life Tenant.
The leading and classic case in this category is Harrison v.
Pepper, upon which the majority '0 of the courts faced with this problem have based their holdings, and the reasoning of which has been
widely adopted. Here the court rejected the proposition of the remainderman that a trust be declared in proceeds which the life tenant
had secured on the full value of the fee. It was held per Morton, J.:
"The contract of insurance is a personal contract and inures
to the benefit of the party with whom it is made and by whom the
premiums are paid. . . . Whether the amount of indemnity
received by the defendant for her loss was more or less than the
value of her interest cannot affect the plaintiff. Nor can the
defendant be converted into a trustee for the plaintiff by the mere
fact that the amount which she received was equal to the full
value of the house." "l
Despite the lucidity of the court's reasoning, there appeared
within a year the decision of Green v. Green 12 which was to become
the support of the minority school, which allows recovery to the
remainderman-lessor. Here, faced with a situation similar to that in
Harrisonv. Pepper," the South Carolina court held that the proceeds
from the policy should be used in rebuilding or go to the remainderman reserving the interest for life. Impressing a trust upon the fund,
Pope, J., held:
"Our own state along with others holds the doctrine that a
life tenant holds the relation of an implied or quasi trustee to the
remaindermen, and that any proceeds of a fire policy are subject
to the laws regulating trusts." 14
'See cases cited suipra notes 5, 6 and 7. The reflection of this sentiment

is invariably present.
1i66 Mass. 288, 44 N. E. =2 (i896).
'o Blanchard v. Kingston, supra note 6; Spalding v. Miller, 1o3 Ky. 405,
45 S. W. 462 (1898) (no trust resultir.g in any part of the proceeds) ; Sanders
v. Armstrong, 22 Ky. S. Rep. 1789 (igoi); Addis v. Addis, 6o Hun 581, 14
N. Y. Supp. 657 (I89i) (remainderman has no rights to the proceeds) ; Bennett v. Featherstone, nio Tenn. 27, 71 S. W. 589 (1902).
a'Harrison v. Pepper, supra note 9 at 289, 44 N. E. at 223. See MCCLAIN,
Insuranceof Limited-Interests against Fire (1897) II HARv. L. REv. 512.

'2Suipra note s.
" Supra note 9.
".Green v. Green, supra note 5 at 533, 27 S. E. at 959.
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Between the Massachusetts and the South Carolina doctrines is
that of Rhode Island. 15 This court advances the proposition that if
the policy covers merely the life tenant's interest, he is entitled to the
insurance in full; but, if the policy is issued to him for the full value
of the fee, he is trustee for the excess over his life interest.
It is submitted that the Massachusetts rule, alone, rests upon
sound legal principle. In the absence of express stipulation in the
contract, by which the one in possession is to insure for the other's
benefit,' 6 and in the absence of other evidence of such intent, none of
the theories which have been advanced warrants an appropriation of
the insurance funds to one other than the insured." Insurance is a
personal contract to pay a sum of money by way of indemnity to protect the interest of the insured."8 The absence of the requisites to
raise a trust is conspicuous. Prior to the fire, the legal title is in the
party who after the fire seeks the status of cestui que trust. The relation of landlord and tenant has in it, fundamentally, nothing more of
trust and confidence than do other contractual relationships. The
parties deal at arms length and the tenant, responsible only for an
unreasonable use of the property,' 9 is under no obligation to insure.20
Sampson v. Grogan, 21 R. . 174, 42 At. 712 (1899). Though Pennsylvania has usually been cited as being in accord with the South Carolina view
supra note 5, it would appear that Pennsylvania if at all is more in harmony
with, and was the basis for the Rhode Island view. Welsh v. London Assur.
Co., supra note 7, per Mitchell, J." . . . the plaintiff . . . by recovering . . .

the full value of the fee, has put herself in the position of trustee for the
remainderman as to the excess of the judgment over the value of her life interest." It must be remembered, however, that there was here found an intent to
insure for the benefit of both.
16Where the tenant is, under an agreement with the lessor, bound to insure
the property, the right of the lessor is undoubted. Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder,
77 Fed. 818 (C. C. A. 7th 1897) (lessor entitled to all the proceeds) ; Convis v.
Fire Insurance Co., 127 Mich. 616, 86 N. W. 994 (iooi) (proceeds to be used
in rebuilding or invested, with interest for the life tenant) ; Hayes v. Ferguson,
15 Lea i (Tenn. 1885).

Likewise it has been held that where the landlord has insured, the tenant,
though required to rebuild, has no claim upon the landlord's proceeds.
'Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder, 76 Fed. 34 (1896) ; Whitehouse v. Cargill,
88 Me. 479, 34 Ad. 276 (2896); cases cited surpra notes io, II;

2

PERRY,

(7th ed. 1929) § 553 n; 7 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE
(2d ed. 1928) 6262, 6271.
'City of Norwich, 118 U. S. 468, 6 Sup. Ct. 1,50 (1885); Brownell v.
Board of Ed., 239 N. Y. 369, 146 N. E. 63o (1925); Earl, C. in Cromwell v.
Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co., 44 N. Y. 42, 47 (187o): "A contract of insurance
against fire is a mere personal contract between the assured and the underwriter to indemnify the former against the loss he may sustain."
. United States v. Bostwick, 94 U. S. 53 (1876) (tenant not liable for accidental fire); Nave v. Bery, 2 Ala. 383 (1853); Lothrop v. Thayer, 138
Mass. 466 (i885).
' Roesch v. Johnson, 69 Ark. 3o, 62 S. W. 416 (igoo) ; Home Ins. Co. v.
Field, 42 Ill. App. 392 (i89i) ; Harrison v. Pepper, supra note 9; JoycE, INSURANICE (2d ed. 1917) 2o54. A covenant to insure is not usual within the
meaning of an agreement to lease with usual covenants. Cosser v. Collynge,
TRUSTS

3 Myl. & K. 283 (Eng. 1832).

NOTES

The theory that the insurance contract runs with the property is
without support in other fields.21 Perhaps, in common parlance, the
building or property is insured, but the general rule has long been that
the insurance contract is only between the insurer and the party insuring provided he had an insurable interest at the inception of the contract and at the moment of loss. 22 To hold that the proceeds take the
place of the property destroyed is illogical, for the tenant is under no
duty to rebuild 23 and, if the property is destroyed
24 without his fault,
he is under no liability because of its destruction.
Likewise to allow recovery upon a vague "public policy", or,
because recovery would be "equitable" is to rest the decision on an
unsubstantial basis. Though contracts of overinsurance are, perhaps,
opposed to the highest public policy, it is unwarranted to apply this
principle in an action by, and for the benefit of, a stranger to the contract, after the money has been paid by the insurance company. This
is expressed in Brownell v. Board of Education:"
"These reasons may savor of a layman's ideas of equity but
they are not law."
Bailor-Bailee
When the favored status of realty in the ancient law is remembered, it would be but natural to conclude that the law would impose
upon one in possession of land under a limited interest a much more
stringent duty and obligation toward the owner of the fee, than in the
case of one in a similar possession of personalty. However, the courts
have not, in the situation examined in this note, so held. As has been
seen, it is only in the minority of the jurisdictions that a trust is
impressed in proceeds received by a life tenant or lessee; but the
almost unbroken rule in regards to personalty is that the bailee holds
in trust the sum realized from the fire insurance. 2 Doubtless much
n Carpenter v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 16 Pet. 495 (U. S. 1842) ;
Lynch v. Dalzell, 4 Bro. P. C. 431 (Eng. 1729) ; Brownell v. Board of Education, supra note I8; Rayner v. Preston, L. R., 18 Ch. Div. I, ii (iSgi) (leading case) Brett, L. 3.: ". . . the contract of insurance is a mere personal contract for the payment of money. It is not a contrad which runs with the land."
' Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder; Whitehouse v. Cargill, both szpra note 17;
see cases cited supra note 18; I JoYcE op. cit. supra note 20, § 2.
'Shupra note 2o; Farmer, J. in junction Mining Co. v. Springfield junction
Co., 22 Ill. 6oo, 624, 78 N. E. go, gi (igo6), "There is no covenant by the
lessee to repair or rebuild . . . by the great weight of authority, the stipulation
in the lease to surrender . . . in as good condition as when received, ordinary
wear and tear excepted, is but an expression of the fmplied common law obligation resting upon the tenant and not a covenant to repair or rebuild"; i TIFFANY,
LANDLORD AND TENANT (191o) § 118. Contra: Armstrong v. Maybee, 17
Wash. 24, 48 Pac. 737 (1897).
1 Supra notes 2o, 23.
2 Supra note I8.
California Ins. Co. v. Union Compress Co., 133 U. S. 387, 1o Sup. Ct.
365 (i89o); Williams Co. v. Auto Express Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 165, 78 At.
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influenced by the classic treatise of Jones

27

on bailments, written in

1789, in which a bailment is described thus,

"Bailment is a delivery of goods in trust on a contract expressed or implied that the trust shall be executed and the goods
, 28
redilevered .
the relation of bailor and bailee has been considered one of semiconfidence and quasi trusteeship. 29 With equal relevancy apply here
the objections which were examined above, to imposing a trust upon
these insurance proceeds in the hands of the bailee. The law of bailments is but a branch of the law of commercial contracts. The insurance policy here, as in the lessor-lessee cases, is a personal one between the insurance company and the bailee. Nor are here the obligations of the bailee, ranging from slight care in gratuitous bailments to
those of virtual insurer, any more those of a trustee than in the prior

category.30

In the analogous situations of the mortgagor seeking the benefit
of insurance funds in the hands of the mortgagee, and the vendor in
an executory contract of sale seeking such of funds in the hands of the
vendee, despite attempted distinctions on the ground that the insuring
party here has but a lien, the rules are in accord with the majority rule
in the life tenant-remainderman cases, and the party insuring and pay-

ing the premiums is permitted the enjoyment of his foresight.3 1

67o (igio) ; Siter v. Morrs, 13 Pa. 218 (i85o) ; Contra: Sickles v. Brabbitts,
82 Iowa 747, 48 N. W. 89 (i8gi) (no cases cited). Adoption or ratification
of the policy by the bailor before the loss is not a necessary condition of his
right to hold the bailee, Snow v. Carr, 61 Ala. 363 (1878). When the policy
covers property of bailor and bailee, the bailee cannot first deduct the value of
his own property. Boyd v. McKee, 99 Va. 72, 37 S. E. 81o (9o). Contra:
Johnson v. Campbell, 32o Mass. 449 (1876).
'JONES,
LAW OF BAIIENTS (1798).
This with the early decision of
Lord Holt in Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 9o9 (Eng. 1703) were the first
successful attempts to reduce the law of bailments in English jurisprudence to
an organized system.
29JONES, op. cit. supro note 27, at 117.
It is interesting to note that subsequent writers, though following Jones in many respects, omit the words in
trust. DoBIE, BAILMENTS AND CARRaERS (1914) I; GODDARD, OuTLINES OF
LAW OF BALMTMrs AND
PROPERTY (18th ed. 1926)
' Gross v. N. Y. & T.
Co. v. Auto Express Co.,

45 N. Y. 6o6 (1871).

CARIERS (2d ed. 1928) § 1; WTmAms, PERsONAL
57.
S. S. Co., iO7 Fed. 516 (S. D. N. Y. i9O0) ; Williams
supra note 26; Waring v. Indemnity Insurance Co.,

' As to the contractual nature of a bailment: Krumsky v. Loeser, 37 Misc.
504, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1O12 (19o2); Todd v. Figley, 7 Watts 542 (Pa. 1838).
As to the duties, see GODDARD, op. cit. supra note 28, §§ 14, 15, 16.

The vendee takes the insurance free from any liens of the vendor, Hammer v. Johnson, 44 Ill. 192 (1867) ; Whitehouse v. Cargill, supra note 17. Likewise the mortgagor has no right to have proceeds in the hands of the mortgagee applied to the debt, McIntire v. Plaisted, 68 Me. 363 (1878) ; but otherwise if the insurance is effected at the request of and at the expense of the
mortgagor, Concord 'Fire Insurance Co. v. Woodbury, 45 Me. 447 (1858).

9oi

NOTES

In conclusion, to create a trust in insurance funds secured and
paid by one who has a limited interest and who is under no obligation
to insure or restore the property is without support in the law of
trusts, opposed to the intrinsically personal nature of an insurance
contract and a misapplication of the rules against over-insurance.
Nor can it be justified on the basis of business necessity, for the right
of the owner to insure remains unimpaired, and a provision for insurance by the one in possession for the benefit 3of2 the owner may, if so
intended, be inserted as a term of the contract.
P.H.R.
McArdle v. German Alliance Ins. Co., 98 App. Div. 594, 90 N. Y. Supp.
485 (i9o4); Miltonberger v. Beaconn, 9 Pa. 198 (1848); 1 MAY, INSURANCE

(4th ed. igoo) §§ 8o, 81, 82.

ADDENDUM: The writers of the note, "Rationale of Accidental
Means", appearing in the April, 1930 issue of THE REVIEW at page
762 are B. G. S. and H. P.

